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cial solicitude has been extended to hitherto excluded or under-
represented groups. Rather, the tragedy is that leftist ideologues 
have been so successful in seizing upon the openings accompanying 
these developments. This has thrown up daunting challenges for 
conservatives, both within and outside the academy, as well as for 
old-fashioned liberals who still comprise the "Vital Center" on most 
campuses. Although the outcome is by no means yet foretold, the 
conservative response has to date been disappointingly inadequate. 
This book is certainly not unhelpful or beside the point, but falls 
short of the quality of analysis and proposed reformulation so ur-
gently needed. 
ETHICS, POLITICS AND THE INDEPENDENT COUN-
SEL: EXECUTIVE POWER, EXECUTIVE VICE 1789-
1989. By Terry Eastland. I Washington, D.C.: National Legal 
Center for the Public Interest. 1989. Pp. xii, 189. Paper, 
$10.95. 
Mark Tush net 2 
The independent counsel statute, enacted in 1976 in the after-
math of Watergate and modified somewhat in 1983 and 1987, is one 
of the innovations of our apparently permanent regime of divided 
government. As Terry Eastland notes in passing, the statute reflects 
the belief on the part of a Congress controlled by Democrats that an 
executive branch controlled by Republicans cannot be trusted to in-
vestigate allegations of misconduct by highly placed officials in that 
branch. Eastland questions the need for an independent counsel 
statute, its wisdom on balance even if there is some problem of 
"conflict of interest," and its constitutionality (notwithstanding the 
Supreme Court's decision, over the lone dissent of Justice Scalia, 
that the statute is constitutional). 
Eastland properly locates the independent counsel statute in 
the history of what he felicitously calls "the politics of ethics." Ex-
amining notable instances of alleged wrongdoing by high executive 
officials from 1789 to Watergate, he argues that ordinary pressures 
of politics have always been strong enough to produce forthright 
and vigorous investigations where they were warranted. Even 
Watergate itself, the impetus for the enactment of the statute, con-
I. Journalist and political commentator, and speech-writer and adviser in the Depart-
ment of Justice, 1983-1988. 
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firms Eastland's argument. Richard Nixon's attempt to constrain 
the independence of the investigation that the Department of Jus-
tice had begun produced such a strong political reaction that the 
investigation went forward unimpaired. Although Eastland does 
not direct much of his argument to the Iran-contra investigation, I 
believe that he could have argued just as forcefully that even in the 
absence of an independent counsel statute, the political atmosphere 
of the time would have forced the Department of Justice to pursue 
the allegations of wrongdoing almost as vigorously as the independ-
ent counsel has done.3 
Obviously, not every well-founded allegation of wrongdoing at-
tracts as much attention as Watergate and Iran-contra, and one 
might argue that sometimes the political heat will not be hot 
enough to make it politically costly for the Department of Justice to 
forgo an investigation or prosecution. One might use the prosecu-
tion of Michael Deaver for perjury as an example. Concerning such 
cases, though, Eastland argues that the bureaucratic dynamics of an 
independent counsel's investigation will too often lead to unjustifi-
able prosecutions. The point is not that innocent people will often 
be prosecuted but rather that the usual policies of a regular prosecu-
tor's office incorporate notions of sensible discretion to decline pros-
ecution even where convictions might be obtained, whereas the 
independent counsel, whose sole task is to investigate one-<>r at 
most a few-allegations of wrongdoing, is likely to see his or her job 
as prosecuting rather than as exercising prosecutorial discretion. 
For highly visible cases, then, an independent counsel statute is 
unnecessary, while for less visible ones it is likely to lead to unjusti-
fiable prosecutions. Eastland is, I believe, clearly correct about the 
highly visible cases, although, as I will argue, he does not fully com-
prehend the constitutional implications of the argument he makes. 
Concerning the less visible investigations, however, I am not per-
suaded. Contrary to Eastland's supposition, the track record of the 
independent counsels suggests that they have not interpreted their 
job as requiring prosecutions. Before the statute was amended in 
1983, there were three referrals of allegations to independent coun-
sels, none of which resulted in prosecutions. To 1987, where East-
land ends his account, there were eight. Several resulted in no 
3. The "almost" is important. At the conclusion of the congressional hearings on the 
matter, Oliver North, if no one else implicated in the affair, was politically popular, and 
perhaps a professional prosecutor might have found his popularity sufficient to overcome the 
natural inclination to investigate. Yet, it is worth noting that North was convicted not of a 
large conspiracy but of lying to Congress and of accepting an illegal gratuity, both of which 
offenses he essentially admitted; perhaps a professional prosecutor would have pursued these 
"easy" charges anyway. 
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indictments, including the investigation of Theodore Olson which 
led to a Supreme Court decision. 
Eastland questions the length of the Olson investigation, and 
he may be correct (though I have no independent reason to accept 
his characterization), but for present purposes the key fact is that 
the independent counsel ultimately decided not to prosecute. East-
land also raises questions about the prosecution of Lyn Nofziger, 
which resulted in a conviction that was overturned on appeal. The 
court of appeals found that the statute under which Nofziger was 
prosecuted required a mens rea of deliberate wrongdoing. The in-
dependent counsel had convinced the trial court that the govern-
ment did not have to make such a showing. Perhaps the 
independent counsel was a bit aggressive in this reading of the crim-
inal statute, but, I would think, no more so than most professional 
prosecutors are when interpreting a statute that can be read, albeit 
with some strain, to support prosecutions, at least in a case of com-
parable notoriety. In addition, Eastland notes that the independent 
counsel in the Deaver case attempted to subpoena the Canadian 
ambassador. The Department of State supported the ambassador's 
claim of diplomatic immunity, and the trial court agreed. Eastland 
points out that the Department of Justice, unlike the independent 
counsel, probably would not have pursued the subpoena once it 
heard from the State Department. Finally, in connection with the 
Iran-contra investigation, Eastland criticizes the independent coun-
sel's unsuccessful effort to prosecute Joseph Fernandez, an em-
ployee of the Central Intelligence Agency. The prosecution was 
aborted when the Attorney-General, acting under the "greymail" 
statute, refused to allow the independent prosecutor to use evidence 
that would have required that the defense be allowed to introduce 
classified information from the CIA. 
In all of these instances, which involve relatively low-visibility 
charges, the independent counsels took somewhat aggressive pro-
prosecution positions, well within the range of reasonable policy 
choices. If, as Eastland contends, the Department of Justice would 
not have taken equally aggressive positions, then, it seems to me, 
the case for the independent counsel is strengthened: In low visibil-
ity cases it might be useful to have an independent counsel whose 
moderate pro-prosecution aggressiveness might counter the moder-
ate pressures against prosecution that arise in situations of moderate 
conflict of interest. 
Even if there are some cases where the politics of ethics would 
not impel the Department of Justice to investigate vigorously and 
prosecute where the facts warranted, Eastland argues that the in-
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dependent counsel mechanism is unwise. His primary concern is 
that the mechanism allows everyone to avoid responsibility by pass-
ing the buck: the president can wash his hands of wrongdoing by 
members of the administration by saying that the matter is in the 
hands of an independent counsel and it would be inappropriate to 
say or do anything until the investigation is concluded; Congress 
can similarly avoid the political risks of conducting an aggressive 
oversight investigation. The result is, in effect, government by no 
one. 
There is some force to this argument, though it must be quali-
fied more carefully than Eastland does. The argument about the 
politics of ethics establishes that something is likely to happen-
either a prosecution by the Department of Justice or a legislative 
investigation-in high visibility cases. For those cases, though, the 
political dimensions do not disappear when cases are referred to an 
independent counsel: Democrats will still run against "the sleaze 
factor" even while investigations are pending. As I have suggested, 
the independent counsel statute is easiest to justify for low visibility 
cases. Yet buck-passing and "government by no one" are not, I 
would think, so serious a problem there. Precisely because there is 
little political loss or gain in connection with such cases, there is 
likely to be little buck-passing; in a sense, these are cases for which 
no one was going to take responsibility anyway. 
Eastland also argues that the independent counsel statute is un-
wise because of its impact on the targets and potential targets of 
investigations. Because independent counsels are likely to be some-
what more aggressive than professional prosecutors, Eastland ar-
gues, targets will probably have to spend more in their defense than 
they would if the Department of Justice handled the investigations 
using ordinary prosecutorial standards. The financial costs have 
been alleviated somewhat by a provision added to the statute in 
1983 which authorizes the payment of attorneys' fees to targets who 
are not indicted. The emotional costs might still be high, and for 
indicted targets who are not convicted-<>f whom there has as yet 
been only one (Nofziger)--the financial costs remain. 
Eastland's argument here rests on his admirable loyalty to his 
friends who have been targets, yet I cannot escape the sense that it 
is somewhat overstated. In part, I think, the overstatement is typi-
cal of comments about investigations of white-collar crime in gen-
eral: The tone of the comments is that these are basically good 
people who do not deserve to undergo the emotional and financial 
costs of investigations of what are at most technical crimes. I think 
it notable in this connection that Eastland refers to the independent 
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counsel statute as one "that could be used to criminalize American 
politics," without noting the irony that Michael Deaver was con-
victed of the non-political crime of perjury and that Oliver North 
was convicted of the non-political crime of accepting a gift in con-
nection with the performance of his government service. 
We are talking about the marginal costs to targets of being in-
vestigated by an independent counsel rather than by the Depart-
ment of Justice. One possibility is that the marginal costs will be 
small, in which case, I would think, there is not much to worry 
about. Another possibility is that the marginal costs will be large, 
in which case there is some tension between the cost-to-defendants 
argument and the argument about the politics of ethics. For if the 
marginal costs are large, that must be because either Congress or 
the Department of Justice will not investigate nearly as vigorously 
as an independent counsel would. As I have suggested, I am im-
pressed by Eastland's argument that political considerations-the 
fear that the Department of Justice and through it the President 
will be criticized for playing favorites-will lead to relatively vigor-
ous investigations. But if that is so, then the marginal costs of the 
independent counsel statute to targets are indeed relatively small. 
Eastland also expresses concern about costs to the public in the 
performance of the work of those in the now approximately seventy 
positions governed by the statute. Here too Eastland's loyalty 
comes through in an extraordinary passage in which he addresses 
the reader in the second person, as if many of us were likely to 
occupy covered positions at some point in our lives. The concern is 
with the chilling effect of the statute: People in covered positions 
may "steer clear" of the line between wrongful conduct and permis-
sible conduct, thereby depriving the public of actions that, though 
permissible, are close enough to the line to make officials concerned 
about the risk that someone will think, erroneously, that they 
crossed the line. I have two difficulties with this argument. The 
first concerns "chilling effect" arguments in general. Such argu-
ments presuppose that there is a line that divides the permissible 
from the wrongful, and that everything on the permissible side of 
the line, no matter how close to it, is equally permissible. My sense 
of things, though, is that if an official's action is barely justified, 
lying very close to the line, the chances are pretty good that the 
public would be better off if the official found something to do that 
was more clearly permissible-farther from the line. But, even if 
that argument is wrong, and deterring permissible action close to 
the line is rather costly, still I wonder whether the behavioral as-
sumptions that justify "chilling effect" arguments actually describe 
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the people who occupy high positions in the national government. 
Low-level bureaucrats might shade their decisions out of fear of un-
justifiable prosecution, but the high officials who are covered by the 
statute, I think, get so much pleasure out of being "players" that it 
strikes me as simply unrealistic to make the same motivational as-
sumptions about them. 
Finally, there is the constitutional question. Eastland is not a 
lawyer, and his chapter on constitutionality does little more than 
recount the Court's decision in Mo"ison v. Olson and approve the 
points Justice Scalia made in his dissent. Embedded in Eastland's 
account, though, are views of the constitutional order that deserve 
special attention, because they raise fundamental issues more 
clearly than the opinions in Morrison did. Eastland opens his book 
with a discussion of the politics of ethics, and characterizes the in-
dependent counsel statute as a weapon wielded by Democrats con-
trolling Congress against Republicans controlling the presidency. 
One might, therefore, consider the independent counsel statute as 
simply another episode in the politics of ethics, and conclude that, 
to the extent that other political weapons can be wielded in that 
contest, so can this one. If a vigorous congressional investigation of 
political wrongdoing does not disturb the constitutional order, the 
argument would go, a statute passed by Congress and signed by the 
president can hardly do so. In this connection it is worth noting 
that Ronald Reagan twice signed amendments extending the in-
dependent counsel statute. This is not to make a "waiver" argu-
ment, but it is to suggest that the political contours of the struggle 
between Congress and the president have not changed, with respect 
to this issue, since Watergate, and that it would be surprising to find 
that the politics of ethics would be much different without an in-
dependent counsel statute. 
An image of the constitutional order is generated by talking 
about the politics of ethics. It is one version of the notion of 
"checks and balances." According to that version, the constitu-
tional order, with respect to issues of organization, consists of insti-
tutions operating through ordinary political means to combat each 
other's ambitions. Applied to the independent counsel statute, that 
version would find the statute constitutional, just as it would find 
any other institutional arrangement that emerged from the political 
process constitutional. One might say that, just as Eastland accepts 
the ordinary politics of ethics, the Constitution, according to this 
version of the "checks and balances" idea, accepts a "meta" -politics 
of ethics: The statute no less than a congressional investigation is 
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part of the constitutional order conceived of as embodying politics 
at its core. 
Eastland appreciates the force of this version of the "checks 
and balances" idea, and expresses discomfort at using what he calls 
a "balance of powers" analysis in a "separation of powers" case. 
The language of separation of powers generates a different image of 
the constitutional order, one in which there are divisions of author-
ity between the branches and in which it is therefore important to 
determine precisely "where" some authority is lodged. In this im-
age, "government by no one" is plainly unconstitutional. 
Eastland also tries to use the language of checks and balances, 
suggesting at one point that the politics of ethics is one of "delicate 
balances." In a system of delicate balances, innovations that change 
the balance only a little can have large consequences. So, for exam-
ple, the mere existence of an independent prosecutor statute that 
alters the motivation of public officials on a narrow margin may 
nonetheless be unconstitutional. 
I do not know how one could demonstrate that, as I believe, 
the constitutional order is one of crude rather than delicate bal-
ances. One point that Eastland makes, however, suggests that even 
he is not fully committed to the idea of delicate balances. At the 
same time that he argues that the independent counsel statute weak-
ens both congressional and presidential responsibility for dealing 
with wrongdoing, Eastland argues that the independent counsel 
statute strengthens Congress's hand vis-a-vis the President, or at 
least strengthens the Democrats who control Congress vis-a-vis the 
Republicans who control the Presidency. Perhaps the independent 
counsel statute does weaken both branches, but it weakens the pres-
idency more than the Congress, thereby improving the relative posi-
tion of Congress. The fact that the argument must get rather 
complicated at this point, though, suggests that Eastland has actu-
ally identified the kind of adjustments of rough balances that are 
more compatible with the crude rather than the delicate balance 
theory. 
In the end, Eastland shows that the independent counsel stat-
ute is less necessary, and less wise, than many have supposed. He 
also shows how the statute fits into the contemporary politics of 
ethics in a divided government. I believe, however, that Eastland's 
own arguments, taken together, provide support for the conclusion 
that the statute is constitutional, because the Constitution creates a 
crude checks and balances system and then validates whatever the 
system produces. 
